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The Future of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Governance: SPS-Plus or SPS-Minus?
Markus WAGNER*
Food safety plays an increasingly important role in today’s interdependent trading relations. The
existing multilateral rules embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures are increasingly being supple-
mented by a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Unlike debates surrounding intellec-
tual property rights, the negotiations concerning SPS rules in preferential trade agreements are
rarely analysed in a systematic and detailed manner. The article uses the SPS Chapter
negotiated for purposes of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) as a model for
the future of SPS governance and compares it to the existing disciplines under the SPS
Agreement. While the future of the TPPA in its current iteration may be in doubt, the US
has clearly posited its SPS Chapter as a blueprint for future SPS governance. While the SPS
Chapter contains some procedural advances in SPS governance, its substantive rules – or lack
thereof – are not only at odds with the existing SPS regime; they exhibit a flawed understanding
of scientific enquiry and how to deal with the uncertainty inherent therein.
1 INTRODUCTION
Within the context of international trade negotiations, issues such as intellectual
property rights or investment law often receive considerable attention.1 Reports
sometimes highlight particularly egregious health hazards concerning food or feed
safety or disputes that involve e.g. hormone-treated beef or genetically modified
organisms (GMOs). While food safety is a topic of increasing importance – and
contention – on the global, regional and domestic level for developed and devel-
oping countries alike,2 it rarely receives systematic and detailed attention in public
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1 Kimberlee Weatherall, Intellectual Property in the TPP: Not ‘The New TRIPS’, 17 Melb. J. Int’l L. 1
(2016); Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through Greater Precision in Investment
Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 J. Int’l Econ. L. 27 (2016).
2 World Health Organization, Research Synthesis Methods in an Age of Globalized Risks: Lessons from the
Global Burden of Foodborne Disease Expert Elicitation, 36 Risk Analysis 191, 192 (2016); World Health
Organization, WHO’s First Ever Global Estimates of Foodborne Diseases Find Children Under 5 Account for
debates. This is understandable given that it is often regarded as a specialized sub-
field of international trade law. In the negotiations of the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Chapter within the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPPA) the issue did not receive much public attention. Given the systemic
changes it introduces in comparison to the existing SPS regime, this article aims
to fill this void and compares and contrasts the SPS Chapter with the WTO SPS
Agreement.
Although not exclusively a provenance of agriculture, SPS measures – i.e.
measures dealing with food safety as well as animal and plant health regulations –
predominantly concern agricultural products and production methods. This is true
for at least two reasons: agriculture supports a significant portion of the economy
and, even though the economic importance of agriculture is declining in relation
to other sectors of the economy, it occupies an important political space in many
societies.3 This in turn gives agricultural producers significant influence in political
decision-making processes.4
SPS measures are inherently complex as scientific and institutional matters, in
turn raising larger questions concerning international economic governance. The
locus of governing SPS measures has so far been the WTO, under the umbrella of
which the SPS Committee has provided a forum for discussion, negotiation and
dispute settlement.5 As the WTO’s legislative function has increasingly faded in
importance,6 that focus has shifted towards bilateral agreements as well as more
integrated and advanced agreements covering trade and other economic areas.7
The two most prominent examples are the TPPA and the Trans-Atlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP).8
Almost One Third of Deaths (2015), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/food
borne-disease-estimates/en (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
3 Ronald J. Herring, How is Food Political? Market, State, and Knowledge, in The Oxford Handbook of Food,
Politics, and Society 5 (Ronald J. Herring ed., 2015); The World Bank, Agriculture, Value Added (% of
GDP) (2014), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?end=2014&start=1995&
view=chart (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
4 Ying Chen, Trade, Food Security, and Human Rights: The Rules for International Trade in Agricultural
Products and the Evolving World Food Crisis (Ashgate 2014).
5 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (Oxford
University Press 2009); Markus Wagner, Interpreting the SPS Agreement: Navigating Risk, Scientific
Evidence and Regulatory Autonomy, in Research Handbook on WTO Dispute Settlement (forthcoming)
(Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds, 2017); Alberto Alemanno, The Multilateral Governance Framework
for Food Safety: A Critical and Normative Overview, in Food Safety, Market Organization, Trade and
Development 10, 28–29 (Abdelhakin Hammoudi et al. eds, Springer 2013).
6 Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization 557 (World Trade
Organization 2013).
7 Ching-Fu Lin, SPS-Plus and Bilateral Treaty Network: A ‘Global’ Solution to the Global Food Safety
Problem?, 29 Wis. Int’l L.J. 694, 704 et seq. (2012).
8 Daniel S. Hamilton, America’s Mega-Regional Trade Diplomacy: Comparing TPP and TTIP, 49 Int’l
Spectator 81 (2014); Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, How Will TPP and TTIP
Change the WTO System, 18 J. Int’l Econ. L. 1, 1–3 (2015).
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The article analyses the SPS obligations in the TPPA, posits them as one
model for a new generation of SPS governance and compares and contrasts them
with the disciplines of the SPS Agreement. These new features include a different
understanding of scientific uncertainty and various procedural cooperation and
coordination requirements. The article sheds light on the extent to which the
SPS Chapter can justifiably be characterized as extending beyond, being congruent
with, and falling short of the SPS Agreement.
There is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the US will ratify the TPPA
given the continuing and growing general opposition to deepening trade and
investment integration and the position of the US administration under Donald
Trump in particular. Regardless of the outcome in this concrete instance, deep
trade agreements such as the TPPA or TTIP provide a blueprint for future
integration efforts and will likely be used in future negotiations.9 Given that the
US has not only provided the impetus for the TPPA and was its most vocal
proponents, but also considered the TPPA to constitute the ‘highest-standard and
most progressive trade deal ever negotiated’,10 its treaty language will either remain
largely intact and be reintroduced under a different label11 or be replicated in
future agreements.12
2 THE TPP AGREEMENT AND ITS SPS CHAPTER AS A MODEL FOR
A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE?
2.1 THE TPPA’S LEGAL AND GEOPOLITICAL FRAMEWORK
TPPA negotiations between the prospective Member States were concluded in
October 2015 after nineteen rounds of negotiations as well as chief negotiators and
ministerial meetings over a five year period.13 The moniker ‘mega-regional’ is
unusually apt given the countries involved in the TPPA – Australia, Brunei,
9 Heng Wang, The Future of China’s Approach to International Economic Law in Deep FTAs Era: A Paradigm
Shift Towards Deep FTAs Lite? (unpublished manuscript on file with author) 1, 2 (2016); Bryan
Mercurio, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Suddenly a ‘Game Changer’, 37 World Economy 1558, 1560
(2014).
10 Ben Otto, U.S., China Intensify Trade Competition on APEC Stage, Wall St. J. (18 Nov. 2015).
Australian Minister for Trade and Investment Andrew Robb characterized the TPPA as the ‘biggest
global trade deal in twenty years’. Minister for Trade and Investment, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Pact to Drive Jobs, Growth and Innovation for Australia (2015), http://trademinister.gov.au/releases/
Pages/2015/ar_mr_151006.aspx (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
11 TPP Action Unlikely in 2017, but Chance for ‘Rebranded’ Deal Seen as Possible Later in Trump Presidency,
Inside US Trade (30 Dec. 2016).
12 There are indications that negotiations already under way have used the TPPA as a template. Andrew
D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Foreword: The Continuing Relevance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 17 Melb.
J. Int’l L. i, v (2016).
13 United States Trade Representative, Dispute Settlement (2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
TPP-Chapter-Summary-Dispute-Settlement.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2017). See also Fergusson et al.,
THE FUTURE OF SPS GOVERNANCE 447
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the
United States and Vietnam. They are not only geographically and culturally
diverse, but also differ with respect to their geopolitical, trade and investment
interests, government involvement in the domestic economies, as well as their
levels of development. The TPPA extends to 36% of global Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and 23% of international trade.14 It would almost nullify tariff
barriers among the parties and have a significant impact on non-trade barriers.15
Originally conceived of as an agreement among only four countries, the entry
into the negotiations of the United States created a new dynamic for the
negotiations.16 But even then it was a proposal for an agreement between the
US and eight small and medium-sized economies, some of whom already had
existing trade agreements with the US. With the addition of Canada, Mexico and
Japan, the TPPAA became a more economically meaningful undertaking. The
inclusion of Japan in particular was important given the lack of existing agreements
with many trading partners and the relatively high barriers to entry for foreign
products and services.17
In addition to what one has come to expect from trade and investment
agreements such as National Treatment and Market Access, Rules of Origin,
Trade Remedies, SPS Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Trade
in Services, Financial Services, Telecommunications, and Intellectual Property, the
TPP’s more than 6,000 pages also include chapters on Investment, E-Commerce,
Competition, State-Owned and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs),18
Environment, Regulatory Coherence and Transparency and Anti-Corruption.
This is in addition to a dispute settlement mechanism and a large number of
annexes, related instruments and bilateral agreements.
The TPPA also – with the exception of the European Union (EU) and
potentially the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – probes more
deeply into the domestic policy and administrative sphere of its parties than most
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, 22 Current Politics and Economics of
South, Southeastern, and Central Asia 209, 231–234 (2013).
14 Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates
2 (Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper Series WP 16-2, Jan. 2016) There
are conflicting views as to the economic impact on domestic economies. Fergusson et al., supra n. 13,
at 221–232.
15 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects: Spillovers Amid Weak Growth(2016) 223.
16 Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.
C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 27, 30–34 (2011).
17 Cullen Hendrix & Barbara Kotschwar, Agriculture, in Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Volume 1:
Market Access and Sectoral Issues 46 (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2016).
18 On SMEs, see Heng Wang, The Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for SMEs: Opportunities and
Challenges, 6 KLRI J. L. & Legis. 45 (2016).
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other treaties. This is best evidenced by the inclusion of the chapter on regulatory
coherence.19
On a strategic level, the TPPA incorporates a model of economic integration
that is quite different from other – competing – models. It has been described as
forming part of the US’s pivot towards Asia. Unlike the current ‘shallow’ under-
taking by China, which exhibits a considerably lesser degree of integration,20 the
TPPA has been described as ‘[preventing] … China from setting less-demanding
trade rules that would hinder U.S. interests’.21 The US government claims that it
does so by ‘setting high-standard trade rules’, ‘providing ambitious liberalization of
trade and investment’ and ‘creating a new and compelling model for trade’.22 This
will undoubtedly have implications for the ongoing negotiations between China and
the EU and China and the US. It is hard to imagine – as a strategic matter – that the
US or the EU would accept a lower standard than those in existing treaties –
provided that the TPPA or the TTIP will actually come to fruition.
2.2 THE SPS CHAPTER
The objectives of the SPS Chapter are the protection of human, animal or plant or
life or health in states parties in a transparent manner, to ‘reinforce and build on the
SPS Agreement’, increase ‘communication, consultation and cooperation between
the Parties’, while preventing that SPS measures ‘create unjustified obstacles to
trade’, and to ‘encourage the development and adoption of international standards,
guidelines and recommendations’.23 While the Chapter is said to be novel,24
Article 7.4 affirms the Parties’ ‘rights and obligations under the SPS Agreement’
19 Alberto Alemanno, The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership: Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences, 18 J. Int’l Econ. L. 625 (2015);
Elizabeth Sheargold & Andrew D. Mitchell, The TPP and Good Regulatory Practices: An Opportunity
for Regulatory Coherence to Promote Regulatory Autonomy?, 587 World Trade Rev. 9–11 (2016); Rodrigo
Polanco, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and Regulatory Coherence, in Trade Liberalization and
International Co-operation: A Legal Analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 231 (Tania Voon ed.,
Edward Elgar 2013); Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 Univ. Pa. J. Int.
Law 1 (2016).
20 Wang, supra n. 9, at 5.
21 Otto, supra n. 10; Brock R. Williams et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications 9–12
(Congressional Research Service 2016).
22 The White House, Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders Statement (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/11/18/trans-pacific-partnership-leaders-statement (accessed 24 Feb. 2017). See
also C. Fred Bergsten, A Bilateral Investment Treaty and Economic Relations Between China and the United
States 45 (PIIE Briefing 15-1, 2015); Shiro Armstrong, China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Crawford
School of Public Policy 2012), https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/events/2012/20120508-ppt.pdf
(accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
23 Art. 7.2 TPPA.
24 United States Trade Representative, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 4–5 (2016), https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Sanitary-and-Phytosanitary-Measures-1.pdf (accessed 24
Feb. 2017).
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and that ‘[nothing] in this Agreement shall limit the rights and obligations that each
party has under the SPS Agreement’.25
The parallels between the SPS Agreement and the SPS Chapter start with the
definition of what constitutes an SPS measure, adopting the definition of Annex A
of the SPS Agreement.26 Similarly, the SPS Chapter contains provisions pertaining
to product criteria, processing methods, quarantine measures as well as certifica-
tion, inspection, testing and sampling requirements. It describes risk analysis,
prescribes non-discrimination and having a scientific basis for taking regulatory
action. Members also need to act in way that is no more trade restrictive than
necessary and carry out their measures in a transparent manner. This is buttressed
by a number of rules designed to align administrative processes with one another
and to provide an institutionalized framework for cooperation and coordination.
The treatment of agricultural products has been and continues to be an
important topic for trade negotiators given the outsize influence farming lobbies
hold in virtually all countries. TPPA negotiations have again shown the sensitive
nature of this policy area, its susceptibility to governmental regulation (often at the
behest of domestic pressure groups) and potential for abuse. While most tariffs on
agricultural products would be eliminated,27 this did not mean that those that
pushed the hardest for trade liberalization – major agricultural exporters like
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States – did not do their utmost
to protect domestic industry sectors that were heavily subsidized and lobbied hard
to maintain the support they received.28
3 THE SPS CHAPTER: PARALLELS WITH THE SPS AGREEMENT,
IMPORTANT SPS-PLUS AND SPS-MINUS ELEMENTS
Some SPS Chapter provisions are genuinely ‘legal instruments that include more
detailed or demanding rules than those under the SPS Agreement or that contain
additional regulatory or cooperative elements beyond the scope of the SPS
Agreement’,29 and thus fall into the SPS-Plus category. This includes moving
from ex post facto administrative action to preventive measures, improved coopera-
tion and coordination, communication concerning the imposition and
25 Art. 7.4 TPPA.
26 Art. 7.1 (1) TPPA.
27 Global Affairs Canada, Opening Markets for Agricultural and Agri-Food Products (2015), http://www.
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/benefits-avantages/sec
tors-secteurs/01-AgriSector.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
28 See e.g. statement by then-US Trade Representative Michael Froman: ‘[S]ugar’s obviously a great
sensitivity to our market here, and whatever we do in that area won’t undermine the sugar program.’
American Sugar Alliance, USTR Stands Strong with US Sugar Producers (2015), http://sugaralliance.
org/ustr-stands-strong-with-u-s-sugar-producers (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
29 Lin, supra n. 7, at 715 (emphasis in original).
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implementation of SPS measures between domestic regulatory agencies and an
increased level of transparency for SPS measures. Where genuine improvements
over the SPS Agreement occur, they concern largely procedural matters. On the
flipside, some of the substantive content of the SPS Chapter are problematic
deviations from existing SPS Agreement disciplines and are best characterized as
SPS-minus.
Both the SPS Agreement and the SPS Chapter attempt to resolve the tension
between trade liberalization on the one hand and securing food safety on the other
by facilitating the exchange of goods while providing WTO Members requisite
regulatory autonomy. The do so however through different methods and with a
different weighing of these competing goals.30 E.g. the SPS Agreement allows for
governments to rely on the precautionary principle in situations in which they lack
scientific evidence to conduct a risk assessment, but possess ‘pertinent information’
concerning potential risk.31 The SPS Agreement therefore entails a spectrum of
possibilities for governments when making regulatory decisions: ranging from
domestic measures conforming with or being based on international standards, to
governments carrying out their own risk assessment or relying on the precaution-
ary principle.
The following analysis is not meant to be comprehensive, but is illustrative of
some of the major advances and shortcomings of the SPS Chapter. The division
between substantive, procedural and dispute settlement aspects serves explanatory
purposes and is not meant to express a stark division between these areas. Indeed,
in a number of important ways the substantive and procedural elements are
mutually reinforcing.
3.1 SUBSTANCE
3.1[a] Risk Analysis Under the TPPA: Misunderstanding Scientific Uncertainty, Less Regulatory
Autonomy, Potentially More Risk
One of the central elements of evaluating SPS measures is how governments deal
with risk. There has been considerable discussion in the SPS Agreement
30 Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 Univ.
Pa. J. Int’l L. 1, 56–61 (2014).
31 Jacqueline Peel, The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision-making and Scientific
Uncertainty (Federation Press 2005); Joanne Scott & Ellen Vos, The Juridification of Uncertainty:
Observations on the Ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle within the EU and the WTO, in Good
Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds, Oxford
University Press 2002); Markus Wagner, Taking Interdependence Seriously: The Need for a Reassessment
of the Precautionary Principle in International Trade Law, 20 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 713 (2012).
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jurisprudence32 and some of the scholarly literature33 over the distinction between
the textually mandated risk assessment and what some consider a separate stage of
‘risk management’. Under the framework put forth by the panel in EC – Hormones,
risk assessment is a scientific and empirical inquiry devoid of policy considerations
and social value judgments, while risk management consists of a Member having to
decide, ‘on the basis of its own value judgments, whether it can accept these
risks’.34 The SPS Chapter extends the framework of risk analysis into three
components: risk assessment, risk management; and risk communication. While
leaving the notion of risk assessment undefined, it specifies that ‘risk management
means the weighing of policy alternatives in light of the results of risk assessment
and, if required, selecting and implementing appropriate control options, including
regulatory measures’ and defines risk communication as the ‘exchange of informa-
tion and opinions concerning risk and risk-related factors between risk assessors,
risk managers, consumers and other interested parties’.35
Three things are noteworthy about the risk analysis definition. First, by not defining
risk assessment the SPS Chapter adopts the approach of the SPS Agreement contained in
Annex A:4 SPS Agreement.36 On that basis theWTOAppellate Body (AB) defined risk
assessment as ‘a process characterized by systematic, disciplined and objective enquiry and
analysis, that is, a mode of studying and sorting out facts and opinions’.37 It found that a
risk assessment does not require the establishment of ‘aminimumquantifiablemagnitude
of risk’ and can rely on qualitative approaches;38 that it was insufficient to rely on
‘theoretical uncertainty’; and that there ‘must be an ascertainable risk’.39 Second, by
positively defining risk management the SPS Chapter directly contravenes the AB’s
jurisprudence and cements the artificial differentiation between risk assessment and risk
32 WT/DS26/R/US & WT/DS48/R/CAN, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (Panel Report), 18 Aug. 1997, paras 8.91–8.160 (US) and paras 8.94–98.100
(Canada).
33 Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the ‘World Trans-science Organization’: Scientific
Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 Cornell Int’l L.J. 251,
267–277 (1998); Christian Joerges, Law, Science and the Management of Risks to Health at the National,
European and International Level – Stories on Baby Dummies, Mad Cows and Hormones in Beef, 7 Colum. J.
Eur. L. 1, 15 (2001).
34 EC – Hormones (Panel Report), supra n. 32, paras 8.97 and 8.163 (Canada) and paras 8.94 and 8.160
(US).
35 Art. 7.1 (2) TPPA.
36 Annex A:4 distinguishes between ‘disease- or pest-related risks’ and ‘food/feed-borne’ risks with
different thresholds of risk and different levels of scrutiny to be applied. See generally Peter-Tobias
Stoll & Lutz Strack, Article 5 SPS, in Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Volume 3: WTO –
Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, paras 12–16 (Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Anja Seibert-
Fohr eds, Nijhoff 2007).
37 WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (Appellate Body Report), 16 Jan. 1998, para. 187.
38 Ibid., para. 253 (j).
39 WT/DS18/AB/R Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Appellate Body Report), 20 Oct.
1998, para. 125.
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management that has been in operation in theUS since the 1980s and has been subject to
criticism.40 The AB rejected this distinction on the basis that it lacked textual basis in the
SPS Agreement41 and that it regarded the panel’s focus on largely quantitative empirical
analysis as insufficient tomirror policymaking in ‘human societies as they actually exist, in
other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world
where people live and work and die’.42 Finally, the inclusion of a third stage – risk
communication – appears designed to allow for easier dissemination of information and
for exporters and importers to react to a change in the regulatory environment or to
individual administrative decisions.
In line with the SPS Agreement, the SPS Chapter mandates that measures
undertaken to deal with a risk are ‘not more trade restrictive than required to
achieve the sanitary or phytosanitary objective, taking into account technical and
economic feasibility’43 and that measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably dis-
criminate between Parties where identical or similar conditions prevail.
International standards play a crucial role in the SPS Chapter to allow for
easier movement of goods.44 Article 7.9 (2) TPPA requires that domestic measures
‘conform to the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations’.
The SPS Agreement contains a parallel provision in Article 3.2 SPS Agreement.
There, conformity with international standards, guidelines or recommendations
means presumptive compliance with the SPS Agreement. However, the SPS
Agreement is more permissive in that it also allows WTO Members to ‘base’
their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations.45
The AB found that while ‘there must be a very strong and very close relationship
between two things in order to be able to say that one is “the basis for” the other’,
a measure ‘may adopt some, not necessarily all, of the elements of the international
standard’.46 The limitation in the TPPA Chapter to conformity means that the
only alternative is for SPS measures to be ‘based on documented and objective
40 See e.g. National Research Council, Commission on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks
to Public Health, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, 18–19 (1983).
41 EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, para. 181.
42 Ibid., para. 187.
43 Art. 7.9 (6)(c) TPPA.
44 Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Relevant International Standards’ and ‘Recognised Standardisation Bodies’ Under the
TBT Agreement’ in The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardization 104, 107 (Panagiotis
Delimatsis ed., Cambridge University Press 2015). The larger problem concerning the reliance on
international standards is the process of creating international standards. Kenneth W. Abbott &
Duncan Snidal, International ‘Standards’ and International Governance, 8 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 345,
345–346 (2001).
45 See EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, paras 163 and 177, respectively. The AB
found that ‘base on’ means that a measure ‘“stands” or is “founded” or “built” upon or “is supported
by”’ the standard, guidelines or recommendation and that a measure ‘may adopt some, not necessarily
all, of the elements of the international standard’.
46 See WT/DS231/AB/R European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (Appellate Body Report),
26 Sept. 2002, para. 242. EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, para. 171.
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scientific evidence that is rationally related to the measures’. At first sight, this
language echoes the findings of a number of WTO panel and AB decisions
concerning the relationship between a governmental measure and the risk assess-
ment to be carried out.47 However, the design of the SPS Chapter, bearing in
mind the analysis above concerning risk analysis, limits the regulatory autonomy of
governments considerably. This is especially the case in situations in which a
government decides that in order to reach its desired level of protection it cannot
be in conformity with an international standard.
The SPS Chapter requires that SPS measures ‘are based on scientific princi-
ples’ and that in situations in which Member States decide to ‘not conform to
international standards, guidelines or recommendations’, measures ‘are based on
documented and objective scientific evidence that is rationally related to the
measures’.48 The first requirement is congruent with the SPS Agreement, the
latter raises considerable problems. It is arguably designed to curb what some
consider ‘abusive SPS measures based on minority science … or exaggerated risk
management responses to minimal SPS risks to human, animal, or plant life or
health’.49 The combination of these rules uses an unrealistic ideal type of science
that leaves out non-scientific factors such as the funding of scientific inquiries and
its effect on impartiality that have an influence on scientific inquiries.50
In line with this, minority science may be perfectly acceptable as a basis for
governmental action as the AB has explained on a number of occasions.51 One
major problem is what constitutes ‘documented and objective scientific evidence’
for purposes of Article 7.9.2 TPPA. Reliance on a small number of peer-reviewed
studies appears inadequate, and given the confidentiality of consultations in the
Cooperative Technical Consultations (CTC), it remains unclear what evidentiary
47 EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, para. 189; WT/DS76/AB/R Japan – Measures
Affecting Agricultural Products (Appellate Body Report), 22 Feb. 1999, para. 79.
48 Art. 7.9 (1) and (2), respectively.
49 Gary Jay Kushner et al., TPP: New Markets Opening Up For U.S. Food Products (2016), http://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dbf1e74f-9762-4af0-a312-835b952431e8 (accessed 24 Feb.
2017).
50 WT/DS320/AB/R United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute
(Appellate Body Report), 16 Oct. 2008, paras 480–482. See also Inka Eberhardt et al., Unlocking the
Deadlocks? GMOs, Science and the Reform of the Legal Framework, 4 MaRBLe Research Papers 253, 269
(2015).
51 EC – Continued Suspension (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 50, paras 591, 705–712. This is the case
as long as a minority view is ‘considered to be legitimate science according to the standards of the
relevant scientific community’. See also WT/DS367/AB/R Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation
of Apples from New Zealand (Appellate Body Report), 29 Nov. 2010, para. 215; Ronald Labonté,
Ashley Schram & Arne Ruckert, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Is It Everything We Feared for Health?, 5
Int’l J. Health Pol’y & Mgmt. 487, 490 (2016).
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basis would ultimately be used.52 The experience in WTO law may be of
particular relevance in this regard: panels and the AB found that ‘reputable science’
exists where scientific opinions possess the ‘necessary scientific and methodological
rigour’.53 While these requirements were elaborated in the context of whether
governments are permitted to rely on minority viewpoints, they provide guidance
for the interpretation of the term ‘documented and objective scientific evidence’.
In sum, the SPS Chapter has a number of shortcomings: it uses a truncated and
inadequate conception of science; its definition of ‘risk analysis’ cements the
artificial distinction between risk assessment and risk management, thus leaving
out important considerations such as institutional affiliation54 or a population’s
propensity to accept particular risk;55 and it mandates conformity with interna-
tional standards, indicating that governments have little regulatory autonomy when
taking SPS measures.
3.1[b] Omission I: Lack of the Precautionary Principle
A second problem arises through what the TPPA Chapter omits. The SPS
Agreement allows for governments to rely on the precautionary principle in
situations in which scientific evidence is lacking. This can be the case when
scientific inquiry does not permit for definitive conclusions or if there is disagree-
ment on how to interpret existing information. This requires ex ante (1) ‘insuffi-
cient scientific evidence’ and (2) the adoption of measures ‘on the basis of available
pertinent information’. Ex post, this necessitates (3) seeking additional scientific
information and (4) the review of measures within a ‘reasonable period of time’.
The AB has made clear that Article 5.7 SPS Agreement is a qualified exemption
from other provisions of the SPS Agreement, but one that does not justify
measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with WTO rules.56 The very
existence of Article 5.7 SPS Agreement has had an impact on the interpretation
of other parts of the SPS Agreement: the AB found that lax requirements con-
cerning specificity when conducting risk assessments ‘would render Article 5.7
meaningless’.57 The direct adoption of the jurisprudence of the WTO dispute
52 Even proponents of the TPPA and its SPS Chapter recognize this problem. Hendrix & Kotschwar,
supra n. 17, at 58.
53 EC – Continued Suspension (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 50, paras 589–590; Australia – Apples
(Appellate Body Report), supra n. 51, para 215.
54 Ibid., paras 480 et seq.
55 Jacqueline Peel, Risk Regulation Under the WTO SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative
Yardstick? (2004), http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/04/040201.pdf (accessed 24 Feb.
2017).
56 EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, para. 124.
57 Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 47, para. 80.
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settlement organs under Article 28.12 (3) TPPA would therefore be contingent
upon a provision that is similar to Article 5.7 SPS Agreement or considerable
adaptation of the SPS jurisprudence as a whole by TPPA panels.
The TPPA Chapter does not contain an equivalent provision to Article 5.7
SPS Agreement. This is unsurprising given that the TPPA is modelled on US
legislation and that the US has consistently labelled the precautionary principle as
an ‘approach’ rather than a legal principle.58 While Article 7.14 TPPA contains
language that is arguably similar to the ex post obligations under Article 5.7 SPS
Agreement,59 it does not mention – and due to the flawed understanding of
scientific inquiry described above cannot mention – the important ex ante require-
ments of ‘insufficient scientific evidence’ and ‘available pertinent information’. It
states that the Party adopting an emergency measure must notify the other relevant
Parties and take their comments into account; that it must review the scientific
basis of its emergency measure within six months and make the results of the
review available upon request; and that it must conduct a periodic review of the
measure.60
The provision’s title – ‘Emergency Measures’ – provides important context for
its interpretation and shows that it is designed for situations that require urgency.
There is no indication in the text of Article 5.7 SPS Agreement or the relevant
jurisprudence of such a requirement. WTO jurisprudence has interpreted the term
‘emergency’ in Article XIX GATT and the Safeguard Agreement in the context of
safeguard measures. The context for safeguard measures is different in that such
measures are taken where a surge in imports causes, or threatens to cause, serious
injury to the domestic industry. The AB report in Argentina – Footwear found that
emergency measures may only be taken when the increased imports are ‘recent
enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and significant enough … to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury’.61 Translated into the SPS context, this means that
emergency measures would cover only a small part of the situations that could
conceivably fall under the precautionary principle as currently interpreted. This
would leave governments with considerably less regulatory autonomy in situations
in which positive scientific evidence to conduct a risk assessment is lacking, but
there are strong indications for potential harm. Examples may include the nascent
issue of endocrine-disrupting compounds or the initial stages of debate concerning
climate change.62
58 EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, para. 43.
59 See also Art. 7.9 (3) (c) TPPA, although the provision is not comparable to Art. 5.7 SPS Agreement.
60 Art. 7.14 TPPA.
61 Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Appellate Body Report), 14 Dec. 1999, para. 131.
62 Wagner, supra n. 31, at 749 and 757.
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This does not mean that the precautionary principle is without problems. The
opponents of the precautionary principle point to the potential for abuse. While
there is some cause for concern about protectionist measures, proper dispute
settlement processes are one way of alleviating such concerns. The AB has
correctly adopted a precaution-based approach in its SPS jurisprudence.63
Allowing governments the possibility to regulate only when a situation turns
into an emergency and not allowing them to do so when risks with potentially
serious consequences can be identified long before they turn into an emergency -
as the SPS Chapter does - is problematic and antithetical to what people expect of
governments.64
3.1[c] Omission II: GMOs as Concerns for Human Health or a Question of Market Access?
A second omission is less conceptual, but serves as an example of how the
important issue of GMOs has been moved outside of the regulatory frame-
work of the SPS Chapter into Chapter 2 on ‘National Treatment and Access
for Market Goods’.65 This is arguably because even the limited opportunities
for countries to assert their regulatory autonomy under the TPPA Chapter to
conduct a risk assessment for GMO products could have proved a stumbling
block for the cross-border trade in such products.
Initially, many saw great potential benefits from GMO products: plants can
be designed to better withstand climatic effects such as too much or too little
rain or sun, can be made to adapt better to climate change, produce higher
yields, increase nutritional value and reduce production costs.66 There are also
potential downsides, such as the uncertainty concerning human health due to
potential antibiotic resistance and increased usage of herbicides due to cross-
breeding of GMO plants and surrounding vegetation. The US has for a
considerable period of time argued that challenges to GMO products are not
based on scientific evidence, but rather politically motivated. This became clear
in the EC – Biotech case.67 Argentina, Canada and the US contested the EU’s
implementation of a moratorium on the approval of importing agricultural and
63 Markus Wagner, Law Talk v. Science Talk: The Languages of Law and Science in WTO Proceedings, 35
Fordham Int’l L.J. 151 (2011).
64 EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, para. 187.
65 Art. 2.21 TPPA contains a definition of ‘modern biotechnology’ (not limited to GMO products) and
limits its application to agricultural products, while Art. 2.27 TPPA includes lengthy and detailed rules
concerning the trade of products of modern biotechnology.
66 There is doubt as to the efficacy of GMO products. See Danny Hakim, Doubts About the Promised
Bounty of Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. Times (30 Oct. 2016).
67 WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R & WT/DS293/R European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (Panel Report), 29 Sept. 2006.
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food imports containing so-called biotech products.68 It alleged that the mea-
sures of the EU and several EU Member States contravened, inter alia, certain
provisions of the SPS Agreement. The panel ultimately found that a general de
facto moratorium existed with respect to approving biotech products; these
measures led to undue delay and were thus inconsistent with Annex C(1) SPS
Agreement.69
This decision, heavily criticized by some,70 was never appealed. Part of the
discussion revolved around the issue of whether GMOs were too novel so that
informed decisions concerning the risk such products pose for human or animal
health could not be reached. The proponents of GMOs argue that scientific studies
do not show actual risk, while the opponents claim that the long-term risks of
GMOs have not been properly investigated. Rather than allowing for products
containing GMOs to be introduced, this view would require additional testing so
as to ascertain whether actual risk exists.71 despite claims to the contrary, there is a
robust discussion and thus serious doubt concerning the health implications of food
containing GMOs.72 The World Health Organization indicates that the products
currently on the market have not shown adverse effects, but also that ‘individual
GM foods and their safety should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that it is
not possible to make general statements on the safety of all GM foods’.73
The placement of products containing ‘modern biotechnology’ (including
GMOs) into the national treatment and market access chapter appears incongruent
in light of these ongoing discussions concerning the potential effect of GMO foods
on human, animal or plant life or health. Disputes concerning GMO products
would have to be brought under Chapter 2, rather than under the more stringent –
although by comparison relatively weak – disciplines of the SPS Chapter. Some of
the provisions of Article 2.27 TPPA indicate that Parties may not need to change
their regulatory framework. Article 2.27 (2) and (3) TPPA do not ‘prevent a Party
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., paras 8.13–8.16 and paras 18.17–18.20.
70 Caroline Henckels, GMOs in the WTO: A Critique of the Panel’s Legal Reasoning in EC – Biotech, 7
Melb. J. Int’l L. 278 (2006); Oren Perez, Anomalies at the Precautionary Kingdom: Reflections on the GMO
Panel’s Decision, 6 World Trade Rev. 265.
71 Angelika Hilbeck et al., No Scientific Consensus on GMO Safety, 27 Envtl. Sci. Eur. 1 (2015); Marek
Cuhra, Review of GMO Safety Assessment Studies: Glyphosate Residues in Roundup Ready Crops is an
Ignored Issue, 27 Envtl. Sci. Eur. 11 (2015). For conflicting meta-studies, see Sheldon Krimsky, An
Illusory Consensus Behind GMO Health Assessment, Sci., Tech. & Hum. Values 1 (2015); Alessandro
Nicolia et al., An Overview of the Last 10 Years of Genetically Engineered Crop Safety Research, 34 Critical
Revs Biotechnology 77 (2014).
72 Hendrix & Kotschwar, supra n. 17, at 42 and 58.
73 See e.g. World Health Organization, supra n. 2. The EU Commission came to a similar conclusion.
European Commission Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, A Decade of EU-funded
GMO Research (2001–2010) (2010), https://ec.europa.eu/research/biosociety/pdf/a_decade_of_eu-
funded_gmo_research.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
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from adopting measures in accordance with its rights and obligations under the
WTO Agreement’ and do not ‘require a Party to adopt or modify its laws,
regulations and policies for the control of products of modern biotechnology
within its territory’. Nevertheless, there are considerable reporting and documen-
tation requirements that apply to this class of products, including information
regarding risk assessments conducted, contact information for the applicable entity,
and any detection methodologies employed. It therefore stands to reason that the
rationale for the inclusion of this provision in Chapter 2 was to soften the
resistance to GMO products and to shift the balance of power towards large
agricultural commodity exporters.74
3.1[d] Summary
While parts of the SPS Chapter are congruent with the SPS Agreement, it also contains
significant deviations. The three issues discussed in this section are cause for concern, as
they have become standard SPS-related matters. They are significant for a variety of
reasons, not least of which is how to adequately translate the results of scientific evidence
into legal decision-making processes and language.75 Given the potentially high stakes
concerning human health that is at the heart of the SPS disciplines in any trade agreement
and given the potential model character of the TPPA for future agreements, this
development is a troubling departure from the status quo.
3.2 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
The majority of the novel content of the SPS Chapter concerns administrative
processes for importing or exporting agricultural products. Compared to the SPS
Agreement, the SPS Chapter extends these disciplines further, giving private
parties a role in the rule-making process and in administrative decisions. Beyond
these changes, the procedural rules introduce preventive aspects that are a signifi-
cant departure from the SPS Agreement.
3.2[a] Prevention as a New Paradigm
Some of the SPS Chapter provisions emulate a trend that has been observed in
bilateral agreements, namely ‘shift[ing] from response-oriented border inspection
to a more preventive approach’.76 The underlying idea is to prevent unsafe food or
74 See Novel TPPA Provisions Aim To Prevent Ag Biotech ‘LLP’ Rejections, Inside US Trade (17 Nov. 2015).
75 Wagner, supra n. 63.
76 Lin, supra n. 7, 715.
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feed products from entering an importing Party rather than having to react once a
harm has already materialized in the importing country. Such measures can take
place at the country level, at the producer level, or a combination of both. The
SPS Chapter grants each importing Party the right to audit the exporting Party’s
authorities and inspection systems on a ‘systems-wide basis’.77 This includes audits
of the inspection programs of the exporting Party as well as inspections of the
facilities. Such audits are to be based on the ‘relevant guidance of the WTO SPS
Committee and international standards, guidelines and recommendations’.78 The
SPS Chapter provides that the Parties need to come to an understanding of the
auditing process prior to its commencement and gives the audited Party an
opportunity to comment on the findings. The auditing Party needs to take these
comments into consideration before reaching its conclusion and /or taking any
action.79 Such conclusions and action need to be supported by ‘objective evidence
and data that can be verified’,80 with such data being furnished to the audited Party
upon request. In this process of reaching a decision or taking action, the provision
somewhat cryptically calls for ‘taking into account the auditing Party’s knowledge
of, relevant experience with, and confidence in, the audited Party’. This provision
appears to give the auditing Party a considerable amount of discretion. Finally, the
Parties are to ensure that any confidential information obtained during the audit
process not be disclosed.81
These changes are significant for a number of reasons. It allows for a
systems-wide audit, thus ascertaining whether the work conducted by domestic
agencies itself is sound as opposed to carrying out audits on an individual
manufacturing plant basis. This requires trust in domestic inspection schemes
and thus at a less granular level compared to inspections at the producer level.
Obviating the need for domestic production plants to be audited by multiple
foreign agencies will arguably increase efficiency. Whether this results in an
equivalent level of food and feed safety will remain to be seen. It is possible
that countries with less developed food safety systems will be able to gain a
similar level of expertise and capacity as the more developed TPPA Parties. It is
also possible that the administrative burden for developing such expertise proves
to be too onerous. The future will show whether shifting the burden from the
importing to the exporting country will lead to a decrease in exports for
developing countries.
77 Art. 7.10 (1) and (2) TPPA.
78 Art. 7.10 (3) TPPA.
79 Art. 7.10 (4)–(5) TPPA.
80 Art. 7(6) TPPA.
81 Art. 7.10 (8) TPPA.
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3.2[b] Cooperation and Coordination Measures
The TPPA Chapter contains a number of administrative measures that are
designed to coordinate procedures and thereby facilitate trade between TPPA
Members. Many of these measures are a positive step towards greater harmoniza-
tion among administrative agencies, although it will remain to be seen to what
extent the power imbalances between different participating countries will have an
effect on the application of these rules.
3.2[b][i] Customs and Trade Facilitation
In order to expedite the customs process for products subject to SPS measures
and therefore to avoid delays or spoilage of products, the SPS Chapter
contains detailed rules regarding the obligations of TPPA Parties with respect
to import checks. In line with the Trade Facilitation Agreement,82 the
procedure must be based on the risks associated with importations; conducted
without delay; and allow TPPA Parties to obtain information on the proce-
dures, analytical methods, quality controls, sampling procedures and facilities
used. It obliges the importing Party to conduct assessments in facilities that are
consistent with international laboratory standards and imposes strict record
keeping.83
An importing Party is required to notify either the importer or its agent, the
exporter, the manufacturer or the exporting Party of cases of import prohibition or
restriction.84 Article 7.11 (7) TPPA mandates that this notification contains the
reasons for the measure, its legal basis and the status of the goods in question. This
must be done no later than seven days from the decision to prohibit or restrict the
import. In order to further expedite the process such notification is to be carried out
by electronic means if practicable. All parties have the opportunity to obtain a
review of the decision.85
Finally, if there are patterns of non-conformity with an SPS measure the
importing Party must notify the exporting Party. An exporting Party can
request information on goods from its territory that were found not to be in
conformity with the importing Party’s SPS measures.
82 Agreement on Trade Facilitation, WT/L/940, 28 Nov. 2014.
83 Arts 7.11(1), (2) and (4) TPPA.
84 Art. 7.11(6) TPPA.
85 Art. 7.11 (7)–(8) TPPA.
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3.2[b][ii] Recognition of Equivalence
A second trade facilitation measure is the recognition of equivalent rules, an
important technique to abolish non-discriminatory trade barriers.86 The technical
requirements of different regulatory regimes may have evolved for historical
reasons or because of different food safety risks in different parts of the world.
One option for such recognition lies in harmonizing the rules among different
countries, as exemplified in Article 3 SPS Agreement. The other avenue is through
mutual recognition that is often administrative in nature and generally based on
consensus.
The SPS Agreement provision on equivalence is sparse, focusing on equiva-
lence of specific products, and is aspirational in nature: WTO Members need to
accept other Members’ SPS measures as equivalent only if the exporting Member
can objectively demonstrate that its measures achieve the same level of protection
as that of the importing Member.87 A subsequent SPS Committee report laid out
the procedure in greater detail.88
In line with this report, the SPS Chapter attempts to achieve equivalence, ‘to
the extent feasible and appropriate’, either for a group of measures taken by a
Member State or ‘on a systems-wide basis’, taking into account relevant guidance
by the WTO SPS Committee and international standards, guidelines and
recommendations.89 Exporting Parties can request that importing Parties explain
the objective and rationale of their SPS measures, having to identify the risks the
SPS measures are designed to address in the process.90 Any request for equivalence
assessment will have to be carried out expeditiously and explain the processes and
plans to be employed in the determining whether equivalence status is to be
granted.91 This is the case when a measure of the exporting Party achieves the
same level of protection as the importing Party’s measure, or ‘has the same effect in
achieving the objective as the importing Party’s measure’.92 The importing Party is
required to implement the measure within a reasonable period of time and can
report the outcome to the Committee on SPS Measures. In case a Party does not
86 Oliver Landwehr, Article 4, in Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Volume 3: WTO –
Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, para. 3 (Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Anja Seibert-Fohr
eds, Nijhoff 2007).
87 Art. 4 SPS Agreement.
88 Decision on the Implementation of Art. 4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (G/SPS/19/Rev.2, World Trade Organization Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measure 23 July 2004). This decision was originally taken in order for developing
countries to have easier access to the markets of developed countries. Mary E Footer, The (Re)turn to
‘Soft Law’ in Reconciling the Antinomies in WTO Law, 11 Melb. J. Int’l L. 241, 264–265 (2010).
89 Art. 7.8 (1) TPPA.
90 Art. 7.8 (2) TPPA.
91 Art. 7.8 (3)–(4) TPPA.
92 Art. 7.8 (6) (a)–(b) TPPA.
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recognize equivalence the importing Party is required to provide its rationale to
the exporting Party.93 When making such a determination the importing Party is –
different from the SPS Agreement – not only obliged to take into account
‘available knowledge, information and relevant experience’, but also the ‘regula-
tory competence of the exporting Party’.94
While this provision places a considerable burden on importing countries, it by
and large replicates existing WTO SPS disciplines. It will remain to be seen whether
this provision essentially serves as a rapid harmonization tool on the basis of the
‘regulatory competence’ of the major agricultural exporters among TPPA Parties.
3.2[b][iii] Improved Coordination Between Domestic Regulatory Agencies
A third element in which the SPS Chapter goes beyond the SPS Agreement is
where it aims to improve coordination between domestic regulatory agencies. As
further explained below, the CTC contributes to improving the coordination
between the relevant domestic bureaucracies. Another is the Committee on SPS
Measures, which is designed to consider and coordinate actions on SPS measures
among the TPPA Parties themselves and as a stepping stone to the WTO SPS
Committee. Institutionalizing the cooperation between the TPPA Parties and
holding periodic meetings has at least three benefits. It will arguably lead to closer
coordination among the members of the TPPA and lead to more streamlined
process between the different bureaucracies; it may aid in avoiding the costly and
time-consuming path of formal dispute settlement and it provides a forum for
further deepening and broadening of the cooperation among the TPPA Parties.
3.2[b][iv] Increased Communication
A final element worth noting is the requirement for additional communication
for domestic agencies. In addition to carrying out a risk assessment and mana-
ging risk, governments are obliged to communicate the results of their efforts in
reaching the appropriate level of protection. Article 7.1 (2) TPPA defines risk
communication as ‘the exchange of information and opinions concerning risk
and risk-related factors between risk assessors, risk managers, consumers and
other interested parties’.
Such communication can take place between TPPA Parties, e.g. through the
Committee on SPS Measures. Article 7.7 TPPA mandates that in situations in
which a Party adopts a measure that affects products from a particular region in an
93 Art. 7.8 (7)–(9) TPPA.
94 Art. 7.8 (5) TPPA.
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exporting Party, it is obliged to notify the exporting Party in writing. Similar
requirements are contained in Article 7.8 TPPA concerning Equivalence. Given
that audits under the TPPA take place on a systems-wide basis, Article 7.11 (9)
TPPA requires that the importing Party notify the exporting Party in situations of
‘significant, sustained or recurring pattern of non-conformity with a sanitary or
phytosanitary measure’. Similar notification requirements exist with respect to
emergency measures under Article 7.14 TPPA.
A second line of communication is between the importing Party and private
parties. This is the case in situations in which a shipment is being inspected. Given
that a large number of SPS concerns are raised with respect to perishable items,
Article 7.11 (6) TPPA attempts to provide importers or exporters a chance to
remedy the concerns of administrative agencies rather than having to face the
possibility of having their products discarded. As pointed out above, the importing
Party has to communicate that a shipment has been inspected and restrictions have
been imposed, as well as the rationale and legal basis for its action.95 This imposes
considerable obligations on the importing Party with respect to its administrative
processes and the human resources required. The efficacy of this rule will have to
be assessed in the future, but it at least has the potential to remedy the problem of
food waste as a result of border measures.96
Finally, the TPPA mandates communication to a more general audience. In
reality, communication of this kind will likely be limited to experts and industry
groups.
3.2[c] Transparency and Public Engagement in the Rule-Making Process
Parties are obliged to document the risk analysis process and provide
information to other TPPA Parties. Article 7.9 (4) TPPA imports something
akin to the so-called notice and comment procedure from US administrative
law into the TPPA.97
The idea behind the notice and comment procedure is to allow for the
inclusion of stakeholders and the broadening of the public understanding. The
process is designed to provide the interested public with the initial analysis of
the administrative agency, the ability to influence governmental rule-making,
and an increase in the transparency of the rule-making process.
The TPPA ‘translates’ these requirements such that Parties are required to
‘[provide] interested persons … an opportunity to comment, in a manner to be
95 Art. 7.11 (7) TPPA.
96 See also Art. 9 Agreement on Trade Facilitation, WT/L/940, 28 Nov. 2014.
97 5 U.S.C. § 553.
464 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
determined by that Party’.98 Interested parties are able to submit their com-
ments within a specified time frame.99 This obligation is reiterated in the
provision on transparency, which explains ‘the value of sharing information
about SPS measures on an ongoing basis’.100 Going beyond other parts of the
TPPA, the SPS Chapter mandates the publication of written comments or a
summary of the written comments from the public with respect to proposed
SPS measures when publishing an SPS measure.101
Whether the ‘alignment’ of other countries’ safety and regulatory systems with
that of the US is an unmitigated good is open to question. Transplanting domestic
administrative rules from one jurisdiction to another entails a range of difficulties.
The US experience with administrative rule-making – especially as it concerns the
ability of some participants in the process to have an outsize influence on the rule-
making process – may also be a cautious tale.102
Other areas in which transparency is mandated concern the publication of
new or altered rules (including an explanation of the rationale for alteration), risks
arising within a Member’s territory and new scientific insights that may alter the
regulatory framework.103
3.2[d] Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Composed of government representatives, the objectives of the Committee on
SPS Measures are to enhance the Chapter’s implementation and to be a forum for
consideration of, as well as communication and cooperation on, SPS matters of
mutual interest.104 The most interesting aspect of this committee could be the
formulation of common positions before the WTO SPS Committee as well as
meetings held under the auspices of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the
World Organization for Animal Health and the International Plant Protection
Convention.105 Given the already strong position of industry groups in the
formulation of standards in these forums,106 fears of weakening the role of the
98 Art. 7.9 (4) TPPA.
99 Art. 7.13 (4) TPPA.
100 Art. 7.13 (1) TPPA
101 Art. 7.13 (5) TPPA.
102 See the contributions in Daniel P. Carpenter & David A. Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special
Interest Influence and How to Limit It (Cambridge University Press 2014).
103 Arts 7.8–7.11 TPPA.
104 Art. 7.2 TPPA.
105 Art. 7.5 (3)(g) TPPA.
106 Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 201 (2017); Tim Büthe & Walter Mattli, The New
Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy 29–33 (Princeton University Press 2011).
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WTO SPS Committee are not unfounded.107 Depending on the degree of agree-
ment among the TPPA Parties, this committee could lay the groundwork for a
powerful common voice in standard-setting efforts in other fora, especially in light
of the substantive differences between the SPS Chapter and the SPS Agreement
analysed above and further discussed below.
3.3 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: A THREE STEP PROCESS
SPS measures are subject to the dispute settlement process laid out in Chapter 28
TPPA. Dispute settlement under the SPS Chapter is a three-step process: the first
step consists of a domestic administrative process, if available;108 the second is
geared towards finding a diplomatic solution; this is followed by a more formal
dispute settlement process should the former approaches not resolve the conflict.
At any time however, if a party determines that the ‘continued use of the
administrative procedures or bilateral or other mechanisms would not resolve the
matter’, it can resort to so-called CTC.
3.3[a] Cooperative Technical Consultations
Resort to the CTC is contingent on the requesting party or parties to make a
written request to the primary representative of the responding party, identifying
the reason for the request, and setting out the applicable SPS Chapter provisions.
The following provisions contain detailed rules concerning the timeline for an
initial response and an initial meeting, with the prospect of resolving the disputes
within 180 days of the request.109 By default, all communication between relevant
trade and regulatory agencies is to be kept confidential unless the parties agree
otherwise or other obligations mandate greater transparency.110 Such a greater
degree of transparency at this stage would be desirable as some disputes over SPS
measures – ostensibly based on scientific evidence – may be resolved at this stage
and it would be important to understand the reasoning for any form of dispute
resolution.
107 For a critical view, see Steve Suppan, The TPP SPS Chapter: Not a ‘Model for the Rest of the World’ 6
(2015), http://www.iatp.org/documents/the-tpp-sps-chapter-not-a-%E2%80%9Cmodel-for-the-
rest-of-the-world%E2%80%9D (accessed 24 Feb. 2017).
108 Art. 7.17 (1) TPPA.
109 Arts. 7.17 (2)–(4) TPPA. Meetings can take place in person or by electronic means.
110 Arts 7.17 (5)–(6) TPPA.
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3.3[b] Formal Dispute Settlement
Only upon exhausting the consultative procedure before the CTC can a Party
resort to the formal dispute settlement process under Chapter 28 TPPA.111 TPPA
panels will have to consider the interpretation by WTO panels and the AB when
considering provisions that have been incorporated into the TPPA.112 The SPS
Chapter is replete with references to the SPS Agreement. Article 7.4 TPPA states
that the parties’ ‘rights and obligations under the SPS Agreement’ are affirmed and
that ‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall limit the rights and obligations that each
Party has under the SPS Agreement’. This can potentially lead to problems in
situations in which an agreement’s approach is different from that already in
existence within the WTO. The AB has interpreted the SPS Agreement in light
of the balance the agreement strikes between the need for universal rules and a
government’s regulatory autonomy,113 which e.g. includes the ability to rely on
the precautionary principle. The lack of such an option must have an impact not
only on how a panel interprets the language of the SPS Chapter, but also how it
translates the relevant WTO jurisprudence. A similar concern arises in determining
which factors are to be taken into consideration when making a risk assessment.
The AB has made clear that Article 5.2 SPS Agreement is an open-ended list,114 an
approach that is in contradistinction to the SPS Chapter.
The SPS Chapter itself contains a provision pertaining to dispute settlement
regarding the use of experts (Article 7.18 TPPA). The ability of a panel to avail
itself of technical expertise either at the request of the parties or on its own
initiative is appropriate given the often intricate difficulties WTO dispute settle-
ment panels have faced when interpreting scientific evidence.115 In this context,
the AB has rightly pointed out the proper division of labour between the experts
and WTO panels: the latter are tasked to make legal decisions on the basis of
information received from the former, but are not in a position to decide what the
‘best science’ consists of.116
Given the potential for conflicting jurisprudence and the increasing significance of
human health in international trade, the dispute settlement chapter’s provision for
greater transparency in dispute settlement is to be welcomed. This includes the ability
of the public to access the parties’ submissions, the openness of the proceedings to the
111 Art. 7.17 (8) TPPA. On TPPA dispute settlement, see Jennifer Hillman, Dispute Settlement Mechanism,
in Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership vol. 2, Innovations in Trading Rules, PIIE Briefing 16-4, 101
(Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs eds, Peterson Institute for International Economics 2016).
112 See Art. 28.12 TPPA.
113 See generally EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37. See also Wagner, supra n. 63, at 194
et seq.
114 EC – Hormones (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 37, para. 187.
115 Wagner, supra n. 63, at 160 et seq.
116 EC – Continued Suspension (Appellate Body Report), supra n. 50, paras 589–590.
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public unless the parties agree otherwise and the publication of the majority of the
decisions.117 The dispute settlement chapter also permits the submission of amicus curiae
briefs, although it will have to be seen to what extent adjudicators will make use of
such submissions.118
4 CONCLUSION
The SPS Chapter of the TPPA contains a number of novel and innovative features. As
outlined above, some of the procedural provisions genuinely fall into the ‘SPS-Plus
category’. This is true – and for as long as it is approached in good faith119 – with
respect to greater coordination among administrative agencies, increased transparency
in rule-making and decision-making, and the recognition of equivalence. On the
other hand, the conception of science, the manner in which the SPS Chapter deals
with scientific uncertainty and the lack of the precautionary principle is a genuine
weakness of the SPS Chapter. Moreover, given the different substantive rules, it is not
implausible that governments wishing to bring a case may choose the forum that they
think may best fit their needs. This is not a new phenomenon, but could in the long
term have an impact on the jurisprudence under the SPS Agreement.120
Although the US entered the TPPA negotiations late, it did so – with the
backing and under pressure of industry groups121 – with the idea of crafting new
rules.122 Once standards are set on the (mega)regional level and used as a template
for further preferential agreements, the stage is set for multilateralizing them at the
WTO level with the help of the new partners. Those that favour a different
regulatory approach – most notably the EU – may find that their own policies
are influenced by such developments or that their opposition to this new type of
SPS governance could become considerably more challenging.
117 Art. 28.13 (d)(i) and Art. 28.13 (b) TPPA.
118 Gabrielle Marceau & Matthew Stilwell, Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO
Adjudicating Bodies, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 155 (2001); Robert Howse, Membership and Its Privileges: The
WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy, 9 Eur. L.J. 496 (2003).
119 Some have expressed concern that the increased cooperation, coordination and information exchange
could be used for future trade disputes. Simon Terry, The Environment Under TPPA Governance, Expert
Paper #4 (Jan. 2016), https://tpplegal.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/tpp-environment.pdf (accessed 24
Feb. 2017).
120 Armand de Mestral, Dispute Settlement Under the WTO and RTAs: An Uneasy Relationship, 16 J. Int’l
Econ. L. 777 (2013); Gabrielle Marceau & Julian Wyatt, Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled:
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO, 1 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 67 (2010).
121 North American Meat Institute, Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations Dallas Round: Negotiations
Regarding Disciplines on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures (May 2012), https://www.meatinsti
tute.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/78494 (accessed 24 Feb. 2017); AG Groups Press
USTR to Make New SPS Provision in TPP Enforceable, Inside US Trade (15 June 2012).
122 USTR May Offer Revised SPS Proposal in TPP, Aims to Go Beyond WTO, Inside US Trade (22 July
2011). On the impact of the US on the final outcome of the TPPA text, see Todd Allee & Andrew
Lugg, Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, Res. & Pol. 1 (July–Sept. 2016).
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This would constitute less of a problem if the new rules reflected how
scientific inquiries actually worked.123 As it stands, the SPS Chapter is regressive
and reminiscent of a throwback to the early days of the panel jurisprudence under
the SPS Agreement. That approach was characterized by a deterministic view of
science that envisaged a high degree of certainty in the outcomes of scientific
inquiry. This is evident in the language of the TPPA Chapter, which not only
cements the artificial barrier between risk assessment and risk management, but also
requires ‘documented and objective evidence’. Where such objective – and pre-
sumably quantitative – documented evidence exists, this is not a cause for concern.
But in the large majority of cases that will be contentious, whether litigated or not,
this is unlikely to be the case. Rather, results of scientific inquiry will contain a
significant degree of uncertainty, with respectable scientists holding different
opinions over the risks inherent in particular products or production methods. In
sum, the SPS Chapter not only shows a troubling lack of differentiation compared
to the WTO jurisprudence. It also regresses – both textually and by its telos – into
a time and understanding of science that many thought was overcome.
123 See generally Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Theory, Culture & Society, Sage
Publications 1992).
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